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CHAPTER 11 
Criminal Law, Procedure 
and Administration 
SANFORD J. FOX 
§11.1. Crime in Massachusetts. The crime trends in Massachusetts 
present a generally brighter picture for the calendar year 1959 than 
they did for either 1957 or 1958.1 In four categories of major offenses, 
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, larceny of over $50, 
and auto theft, there was reported for 1959 an absolute decrease in the 
number of offenses committed as compared with both of the two prior 
years. Burglaries were below the 1958 figure but above that for 1957. 
Of the seven categories of offenses for which three consecutive annual 
reports are available2 only aggravated assault showed a persistent rise 
to a new high. Table I presents the details of this picture. 
TABLE I 
Number of Major Offenses Committed in 
1957, 1958, and 19593 
Murder and 
Non-negligent Forcible 
Manslaughter Rape 
1957 62 
1958 69 217 
1959 60 231 
Aggravated 
Robbery Assault 
950 753 
1,037 775 
842 990 
Burglary 
13,594 
15,498 
14,704 
Larceny 
over $50 
8,790 
9,091 
8,670 
Auto 
Theft 
10,771 
11,014 
10,721 
Even more significant than fluctuations in the absolute number of 
offenses, however, are changes in the crime rates, which take into con-
SANFORD J. Fox is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ralph C. Good, Jr., and Ed-
ward B. Ginn of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§1I.1. 1 The statistical data for this section is taken from the 1958 and the 1959 
Uniform Crime Reports published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Defini-
tions of all offenses herein mentioned may be found in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§IO.I nn. 3-9. 
2 There are no figures for forcible rape in 1957 since prior to 1958 the rape count 
included nonforcible "statutory" offenses. 
3 Compiled from 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64-65 and 1959 Uniform Crime 
Reports 34-35. 
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sideration population growth in indicating whether major crime is 
becoming more or less of a problem. Here, five of the seven offenses 
were committed at a lower rate in 1959 than in 1958, while one offense 
rate showed no change over this period and one showed a startling 
increase. The diminished rates in 1959 for the homicides, robberies, 
burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts all reversed 1957-1958 rate in-
creases.4 Aggravated assault, the lone offense that appears to be out-
stripping population, increased more than tenfold, from an increase of 
less than 2 per cent for 1958 over 1957 to a jump of 22 per cent for 
1959 over 1958.5 Table II contains the complete figures. 
TABLE II 
Number of Major Offenses per One Hundred Thousand 
of Population: 1957, 1958, and 1959 6 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Rate 
Change 
1957-1958 
1958-1959 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Rate 
Change 
1957-1958 
1958-1959 
Murder and 
Non-negligent Forcible 
Manslaughter 
1.3 
1.4 
1.2 
+ 7.7% 
-14.3% 
Burglary 
281.6 
318.8 
287.5 
+ 13.2% 
- 9.8% 
Rape Robbery 
19.7 
4.5 21.3 
4.5 16.5 
+ 8.1% 
-22.5% 
Larceny over $50 
182.1 
187.0 
169.5 
+ 2.7% 
9.4% 
Aggravated 
Assault 
15.6 
15.9 
19.4 
+ 1.9% 
+22.0% 
Auto Theft 
223.1 
226.5 
209.6 
+ 1.5% 
7.5% 
Making some brief comparisons with New England as a whole and 
the country as a whole reveals the Massachusetts changes in rates to be 
generally more substantial than for both of these other two reporting 
areas. 7 That is, where Massachusetts showed decreases in the commis-
4 There is no three-year rate comparison for forcible rape. See note 2 supra. 
5 That is, the 15.9 aggravated assaults per 100,000 of population in 1958 was an 
increase of 1.9 per cent over the 1957 rate of 15.6 offenses per population unit. 
The 19.4 rate for 1959, however, is 22 per cent more than the 1958 figure. 
6 Compiled from 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64-65 and 1959 Uniform Crime 
Reports 34-35. 
7 There is always a substantial risk of inaccuracy when crime statistics are com-
pared geographically because such variables as efficiency and methods of local re-
porting or variations in the legal definitions of offenses may be measured by the 
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sion of offenses (all except aggravated assault) it did so more markedly 
than did the others or it did so in the face of reported increases for the 
others. On the other hand, the rate increase for aggravated assault 
experienced in Massachusetts in 1959 is greater than is to be found 
either for New England or for the United States. Only in regard to 
forcible rape was the Massachusetts record not the best of the three 
areas. These comparisons are summarized in Table III. 
TABLE III 
Rate Changes for Massachusetts, New England, 
and the United States: 1958 to 1959 8 
Murder and 
N on· negligent Forcible Aggravated 
Manslaughter Rape Robbery Assault 
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent) 
Massachusetts -14.3 -22.5 +22.0 
New England -13.3 + 2.7 -15.5 +19.1 
United States + 2.1 - 1.2 - 7.1 + 3.1 
Burglary Larceny over $50 Auto Theft 
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent) 
Massachusetts 9.S 9.4 7.5 
New England 6.5 7.3 3.6 
United States 1.9 + 0.4 0.1 
§11.2. Juvenile delinquency. A desirable change in the definition 
of "delinquent child" 1 was enacted during the 1960 SURVEY year. 
Chapter 353 of the Acts of 1960 removed the exception heretofore 
found in the definition for those who committed an offense punishable 
by death (first degree murder).2 Now a "delinquent child" is "a child 
between seven and seventeen who violates any city ordinance or town 
by-law or who commits any offense against a law of the Common-
wealth." 3 
The result of excising the "except for offenses punishable by death" 
provision is to make the juvenile procedures initially applicable to all 
statistics rather than the actual incidence of crime that they purport to describe. 
See Beattie, Criminal Statistics in the United States, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 49 
(1960). Nevertheless, it does seem safe to assume that over a two-year period reo 
porting procedures and offense definitions are likely to remain relatively constant 
within each reporting unit so that focusing on the change in the statistics during 
that period would appear to be a reliable indicator of geographic variation in of-
fenses known to the police. 
S Compiled from 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64-65 and 1959 Uniform Crime 
Reports 34-35. 
§11.2. 1 Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1949) was the 
last case decided under the old definition. See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.7. 
2 G.L., c. 119, §52. 
11 Ibid. 
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within the age span who violate any local or state law.4 This is emi-
nently sensible since it is assumed· that the juvenile courts can normally 
best inhibit incipient criminal careers and there is no basis for believ-
ing that any class of juveniles. defined solely by the nature and degree 
of offense charged. is less amenable to the inhibiting forces available to 
the court. 
Also noteworthy in the field on juvenile delinquency is the organiza-
tion of a Committee on Juvenile Delinquency of the Massachusetts Bar 
Association in May 1960. This vital step toward focusing the attentioIJ 
and skills of the lawyers of the Commonwealth on the problem of 
youthful offenders cannot help but be a salutory development. 
§1l.3. Reduction of- sentence on parole. A prisoner in a correc-
tional institution of the Commonwealth1 is normally eligible for re-
lease on parole at the expiration of two-thirds of his minimum sen-
tence. computed by first deducting from the minimum awarded by the 
court the amount of good conduct time earned.2 · If parole is not 
granted. the prisoner must be discharged unconditionally upon his hav-
ing served the maximum minus the good conduct time.s When parole 
has been granted the law gives the Parole Board discretion to decree 
unconditional freedom either at the expiration of the term for which 
he was sentenced or at the date computed by deducting good conduct 
time from the maximum or earlier.4 When. however. all the rules of 
parole have been observed and there has been no return to prison for 
violation of parole. a parolee has the right to have his parole terminated 
at the maximum less good conduct date.1I 
Ever since 1947. however. there have been exceptions to this system 
applicable to a prisoner convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge and 
abuse of a female under the age of sixteen.6 If he is released at the 
expiration of the maximum less good conduct deductions. that is. with-
out having been granted parole. he must nonetheless be placed under 
parole supervision rather than be discharged. This supervision must 
last until the date marking the end of the maximum period for which 
he was committed.7 If. on the other hand. he has been released earlier 
on parole the exact period of supervision is in the discretion of the 
Parole Board8 since there is no sex offender exception to the delegation 
to the board relating to termination of parole. This year the legisla-
4 The new law does not, of course. affect the discretion of the juvenile court to 
dismiss a delinquency complaint against a child between fourteen and seventeen 
when it appears that it would be proper to have a regular criminal trial (C.L., c. 
119, §61) for first degree murder as well as for any other criminal offense. 
§ll.!l. 1 This does not include municipal or county institutions such as city jails 
or county houses of correction. 
2 C.L.. c. 127. §l!l!l. 
SId. §129. 
4 Id. §1!lO. 
1\ Id. §129. 
6 Ibid. The offense is made punishable by C.L., c. 265, §2!l. 
7 C.L., c. 127. §129. 
8 See text at note 4 supra. 
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ture expanded this class of exceptions to the parole laws by adding 
eight more sex offenses.9 
As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly the course of wisdom to 
provide "mandatory parole" for all prisoners so that guidance is avail-
able for the transition from the regimented and, in many ways, rela-
tively secure institutional setting to the difficult and frustrating life of 
freedom facing most released prisoners. To the extent that these par-
ticular offenders benefit from the guidance and are led to useful lives 
the community itself also benefits. 
But why should these particular offenders not be able to shorten this 
mandatory parole by use of good conduct time? It would seem that 
the Parole Board could properly be given discretion in regard to early 
termination of mandatory as well as permissive sex offender parole. 
They have the discretion in regard to all parole of other offenders. 
Perhaps it invariably takes longer to readjust sex offenders to a free life 
than it does other offenders. Perhaps - but the writer has been unable 
to discover any studies that indicate this to be so. Related assump-
tions, such as that the sex offender is more amenable to "treatment" 
(here post-incarceration supervision) than other offenders or that he is 
more likely to repeat his offense than are other offenders have been 
declared by a leading authority to be simply not true.10 
It is somewhat more plausible to believe that this addition of excep-
tions to the parole laws is part of the legislature's campaign against 
those who have committed sex offenses.u It is difficult to accept a bona 
fide intention to assist these people back to a useful and happy life in 
freedom. Certainly, if the average parole officer has about 75 cases, 
each case can get a full day's attention only once every two or three 
months.12 Add to this case load the burden imposed by the new man-
datory parole law and it is difficult to believe, in the absence of appro-
priations for more parole officers, that useful supervision was intended. 
This scepticism is supported by another statute that requires the re-
lease of sex offenders to be reported to police authorities.13 Police 
officers are not parole officers; they are in the business of apprehending 
criminals. The report of release merely provides them with a list of 
suspects ~ just in case. But why single out the sex offender to be 
picked up when there is an offense committed resembling his past of-
fense? Involuntary visits to interrogation rooms are of but question-
9 Acts of 1960, c. 524. The offenses are indecent assault on a child under four-
teen, C.L., c. 265, §13B; rape, id. §22; forcible rape of child under sixteen, id. §22A; 
assault with intent to rape, id. §24; assault with intent to rape child under sixteen, 
id. §24B; incest, C.L., c. 272, §17; unnatural and lascivious acts, id. §35; unnatural 
and lascivious acts with a child under sixteen, id. §35A; or attempt to commit any of 
these offenses. 
10 Tappan, Sentences for Criminals, 42 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 332 (1951). 
11 The impression that such a campaign is in fact being waged and is based only 
partly on hard thinking is re-enforced by a reading of the Sexually Dangerous Per-
sons Law, C.L., c. 123, §§l-ll, discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1O.3. 
12 Powers, The Basic Structure of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Massa-
chusetts 76 (rev. ed. 1959). 
13 C.L., c. 147, §4B. 
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able rehabilitative value. In the absence of evidence indicating sex 
offenders to be relevantly different from other offenders there seems to 
be little justification for treating them more harshly. 
§11.4. Use of telephone by arrested persons. The curious statute 
granting persons detained by the police "not charged with a felony" 
the right to use a telephone l has finally been replaced by the legislature 
with one applicable to any person held in custody or arrested.2 Now 
those charged with the commission of a felony have the same right to 
communicate with family, friends, or lawyer as do those charged with 
a misdemeanor. 
The new act provides, as did the former one, both that the detained 
person must be informed of his right to use the telephone "immediately 
upon being booked" and that he must be given access to the telephone 
within one hour thereafter. It must not be assumed, however, that 
these provisions prevent the police from legally keeping an arrested 
person from the telephone. All the officers must do is delay "booking" 
and thereby postpone the duty to inform as well as the running of the 
hour during which calls must be permitted. 
There is no statutory or case law definition of being "booked." 
There are indications that it refers to charging a crime against an ar-
rested person in the records of the police.3 The cases dealing with 
speed by the police in this regard relate to bringing a person before a 
court,4 not to making the entry at the station house. Theoretically, 
there is no reason why the booking cannot take place immediately 
prior to appearance in court, and that may be several days after the 
arrest.5 Until then he may be held incommunicado since the present 
statute does not operate until booking is accomplished. 
In addition, there is reason to suspect that many arrested persons are 
not booked at all, in the sense of having a substantive crime formally 
charged against them, and as to whom, therefore, the police are never 
required to grant telephone access while they are being held. In the 
year ending November 30, 1958, the Boston police made over one thou-
sand arrests for "safekeeping" and discharged or released all of the 
persons so arrested, holding none for trial.6 While there is no assur-
ance that persons arrested for the nonexistent offense of "safekeeping" 
were not, after arrest, charged with some bona fide crime, the fact that 
none of the arrests resulted in detention for trial augers strongly for 
the belief that few, if any, were in fact so booked. For the rest, the 
statute under discussion was completely useless. 
During the same year, there were also nearly five thousand arrests of 
"suspicious persons," all of whom were similarly released or discharged 
§11.4. 1 G.L., c. 276, §33A. See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.3. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 269, enacting a new G.L., c. 276, §33A. 
3 See, e.g., Muniz v. Mehlman, 327 Mass. 353, 355, 102 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1951). 
4 See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.1. 
5 Commonwealth v. Banuchi, 335 Mass. 649,141 N.E.2d 840 (1957). 
6 Fifty-third Annual Report of the Police Commissioner for the City of Boston 92 
(Pub. Doc. 49, 1958). The exact number is 1113. 
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without being held for trial,1 From the facts that no known offense 
prompted the arrest and that there were no detentions for trial, one 
may infer that the police probably did not charge any of the persons 
involved.8 
The total for 1958 in Boston alone, therefore, may run to six thou-
sand instances of arrest and, at worst, outright nonapplicability of the 
telephone statute, and, at best, applicability within uncontrolled po-
lice discretion. In 1959 the method of reporting arrests by the Boston 
police was changed, but there are still indications that many persons 
may have been arrested but not booked, or were booked only when the 
police deemed it wise to do SO.9 
Thus, delayed booking and nonbooking can be, and appear in fact 
to be, effective and legal means of severely limiting the impact of the 
statute. One negative conclusion appears outstanding: It is not true 
that a person arrested in this Commonwealth has a legal right to use a 
telephone to communicate with those whose aid he might require. If 
the legislature deems it prudent that this right exist it should enact a 
statute that says so, repealing the present absurdity that does little 
more than forbid the police to hold an arrested person incommunicado 
when and if they, the police, desire to be so forbidden. Since the statute 
at first glance appears to be a firm supporter of individual liberty, 
though in fact it is not, the deception should be quickly eliminated, 
one way or the other. Matters of such great public concern ought not 
to be left to prediction after the manner of a Delphic oracle. 
§lU,. Right to examination by own physician. In 1958, a statute 
was enacted giving a person arrested by the police and charged with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
7 Ibid. The number is 4918. 
8 Even if there is a practice to "book" as a suspicious person there is still the fact 
that the law requires no particular speed in doing so. 
9 No arrests for "safekeeping" are reported. Query whether this means none 
were made. There were 1353 arrests for "suspicion" but, unlike the 1958 report, 
there is no tabulation of how many persons, if any, were held for trial. Fifty-
fourth Annual Report of the Police Commissioner for the City of Boston 77 (Pub. 
Doc. 49, 1959). The 1959 report also differs from that for 1958 by including, for many 
offenses, the number of persons released by the police, implying that these people 
were arrested for such offenses. Separate entries for the number charged for each 
offense, equal to the sum of those arrested and those summoned, leads again to the 
implication that those released were not charged. Query whether they were 
"booked." There were 1322 reported in this released category. Id. at 76. 
The 1958 report, on the other hand, contained the fantastic tabulation that all 
arrests for designated offenses resulted in detention for trial, except for 40 arrests 
for being disorderly that led to release rather than detention for trial and the 
"safekeeping" and the "suspicious persons" arrests that, as has been noted in the 
text, produced no detentions for trial (Fifty-third Annual Report 86-94). Perhaps 
those who were arrested for a specific offense, other than being disorderly, and who 
were subsequently released were tabulated with the "safekeeping" or "suspicious 
persons" groups. If this were so it would indicate that many of them were not 
carried on the "books" for the suspected offense and may not have been "booked" 
at all. The central point of the text, that many arrested persons do not have a 
right to use the telephone because they are not booked, would be valid under 
either interpretation of the cryptic report of the commissioner. 
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liquorl the right to immediate examination by a physician of his 
choice.2 In addition, the law provided that "The police official in 
charge of such . . . place of detention shall inform him of said right 
immediately upon being booked, and shall afford him a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise it." 
During the 1960 SURVEY year this statute was replaced by a similar 
one containing the additional requirement that the arrested person be 
given a copy of the law, unless a copy of it is conspicuously posted in a 
place to which he has access.3 
The change is an obvious attempt to make more effective the right 
granted in 1958. But since that right is largely illusory the effort to 
preserve individual rights represented by the new law must be classed 
as an empty gesture, one that fails to give persons arrested for this 
offense the legal right to meaningful examination by their own physi-
cians. 
As has already been pointed out in this chapter,4 the police are not 
required by law to use haste in booking persons whom they arrest. 
When the arrest is for an offense involving intoxication the passage of 
time involves the process of de·intoxication so that the less haste used 
in booking, the more worthless becomes the right granted by the stat-
ute. This is true because the physician's testimony of relative sobriety 
at the time of his examination can be perfectly consistent with police 
evidence of intoxication at an earlier point in time. And one who was 
in fact sober when arrested, therefore, obtains no support from a physi-
cian who finds him sober many hours later. It is only when the police 
examination and the physician's examination more or less coincide that 
there is an opportunity to test the issue from more than one point of 
view. 
This is not to say that the police are always, or often, purposefully 
tardy in booking; there is no reliable data from which this could be 
determined. But the fact that the new amendment was deemed neces-
sary does seem to indicate that the 1958 law was being applied with less 
than wholehearted enthusiasm. 
The underlying concept of fair play is indeed laudatory. An op-
portunity for both sides to observe the evidence before it disappears is 
no more than what an impartial system of criminal justice demands. 
It is perfectly clear, however, that this demand is not now required by 
law to be fulfilled. 
If the law is amended, as it should be, to provide for examination 
upon arrest, there is no reason why it should not include the offense 
of intoxication5 or any other offense in which the police estimate that 
a state of intoxication may be of some importance. 
The same comment concerning forthrightness and clarity in the law 
§1l.5. 1 Prohibited by G.L., c. 90, §24. 
2 Acts of 1958, c. 401. 
3 Acts of 1960, c. 237. The new law became G.L., c. 263, §5A. 
4 See §11.4 supra. 
5 G.L., c. 272, §44. 
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governing the rights of those accused of crime made in Section 11.4 of 
this chapter applies equally here. 
§Il.6. Narcotics offenses. Chapter 94 of the General Laws pro-
vides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of use and abuse of 
narcotic drugs. l New penal legislation has affected this regulation in 
several ways.2 
Former Section 217, punishing illegal sales of narcotics other than 
heroin, provided a mandatory minimum prison term of five years for 
a first offense and ten years for second and subsequent offenses, no 
suspended sentence, probation or parole being permitted until the 
minimum had been served. One of the new amendments removes the 
mandatory imprisonment for first offenders, thus permitting a court to 
order probation with no incarceration at all or the parole board to 
order release upon the completion of less than the statutory minimum.s 
This brings the "illegal sale" penalty into line with other narcotics 
penalties for which imprisonment is required for second and subse-
quent infractions.4 
There are, however, several penal provisions of the narcotic drug 
laws that do not so limit administrative and judicial discretion concern-
ing multiple offenders, six of these being found in the law prior to 
19605 and three being provided by 1960 legislation.6 
If all of the offenses in the statutory scheme are designed to lessen 
the risks of drug addiction it is difficult to comprehend why the legis-
lative "threat" to one type of multiple offender is different from what 
it is to another. Query whether there is a factual basis to the legisla-
tive judgment that one who illicitly manufactures narcotics a second 
time is a safer probation risk than one who persistently steals narcotics. 
Serious questions of criminal law policy are raised by one of the 
proscriptions for which probation and parole discretion continues. 
This proscription punishes heavily (up to five years in prison) one who 
§11.6. 1 G.L., c. 94, §§197·217E. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 204. 
SId. §3, enacting a new G.L., c. 94, §217. 
4G.L., c. 94, §212A (illegal sale of heroin); G.L., c. 94, §217A (inducing another 
to violate the narcotic drugs laws), §217B (illegal possession of narcotic drugs for 
sale), and §217C (theft of narcotic drugs), added by Acts of 1960, c. 204. The 1960 
legislation also contains a general penalty provision, including mandatory imprison-
ment for second and subsequent offenses, applicable to G.L., c. 94, §§198-2l7D, for 
which a specific penalty is not provided. Acts of 1960, c. 204, §3, enacting a new 
G.L., c. 94, §2l7E. 
5 G.L., c. 94, §198A (manufacture of narcotics without a license), §20l (violation 
of sales regulations by manufacturer or wholesaler), §202 (failure to label narcotics 
container), §205 (illegal possession of narcotics other than heroin), §21l (illegal pos-
session or sale of instruments for administration of narcotic drugs), and §2l2 (il-
legal possession of heroin). 
6 Acts of 1960, c. 455, amending G.L., c. 94, §199F (receiving narcotics with intent 
to violate the law); Acts of 1960, c. 204, §2, enacting a new G.L., c. 94, §213A (being 
present where a narcotic drug is illegally kept, being in the company of a person 
knowing him to be in illegal possession of narcotic drugs, or conspiring to violate 
narcotic laws); Acts of 1960, c. 204, §3, enacting a new G.L., c. 94, §217D (illegal 
procurement of narcotics from physician). 
9
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does nothing but be present where a narcotic drug is illegally kept or 
deposited.7 Although this portion of the act merely repeats a prior 
provisions it is not too late to inquire into the soundness of this statute. 
There is no requirement that one know or even suspect that there are 
illegal narcotics about in order to be eligible for the five-year term. 
This is greatly different from other so-called "public welfare" 
crimes,9 such as selling adulterated milk without knowledge of the 
adulteration,lO since in the latter cases there is a reasonable legislative 
intention to stimulate care on the part of those in a position to do a 
great public harm if they do not take all possible precautions in their 
business affairs. It may be deemed prudent to punish a subjectively 
innocent milk dealer in order to stimulate other dealers to inspect the 
cleanliness of their plants more often and more diligently so as to 
minimize the possibility of encountering a similar fate. 
Here there is the threshold question of what public harm is pro-
duced or made likely by being in the presence of an illegally-kept nar-
cotic drug. What community interest is protected by preventing such 
events? An answer that would justify this law eludes inquiry. But 
even if there were a satisfactory answer, one must yet look into how the 
law is to accomplish its aim of inducing people to avoid producing that 
harm. What is the analogy to the induced diligence of the milk deal-
ers? It can be only to make a thorough search of every place in which 
one is present to make sure it is "clean." This may be an efficient 
means of uncovering caches of illegal narcotics and it suggests other 
interesting possibilities, such as making it a crime to be in the presence 
of counterfeit money. All would then have to exchange billfolds upon 
every coming together and compare each other's cash with the latest 
Treasury Department flyers, that is, if one wanted to diminish the risk 
of being sent to prison. 
But this is bizarre, more befitting an Orwell or Huxley fantasy than 
a system of criminal justice that ought to be able to offer its society 
reasonable protection without leading that society to the brink of 
paranoia. 
Another portion of this same statute authorizes arrest without a war-
rant for violation of any of its three proscriptions (being in the pres-
ence of illegally-kept narcotics, being in the company of a person know-
ing him to be in illegal possession of narcotics, or conspiring to violate 
the narcotics laws).l1 The intended effect of this provision is not clear. 
The offenses are all felonies12 and the arrest authorization extends only 
to officers. In the absence of statutory authorization to arrest without 
a warrant the common law permits such arrests where the officer has a 
7 Acts of 1960, c. 204, §2. 
8 Acts of 1957, c. 660, §l. 
9 See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1932). 
10 Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. 489 (1864). 
11 There are, of course, many other statutory authorizations for arrest without 
warrants. See statutes cited in Note, Arrest Without a Warrant in New England, 
40 B.U.L. Rev. 58, 73 n.99, 74 nn. 3, 4 (1960). Most of these refer to misdemeanors. 
12 G.L., c. 274, §l. 
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reasonable belief that an individual has committed one of the felo-
nies.13 Judicial interpretation must be awaited to learn if the statute 
is a restatement of the common law or permits arrests on less than a 
reasonable belief. It may be suggested that only the most extreme 
circumstances requiring prompt action (and, therefore, the danger of 
unreasonable action) ought to justify arrests on less than reasonable 
belief. 
§11.7. Counsel for indigent accused. During the 1960 SURVEY year 
the legislature created a Massachusetts Defenders Committee charged 
with the duty of providing counsel for indigent defendants in noncapi-
tal cases in which the law or rules of the Supreme Judicial Court re-
quire representation by counseJ.1 The committee is composed of 
eleven persons appointed by the Judicial Council for four-year terms.2 
Since the rules of the Court require assignment of counsel to indi-
gent and unrepresented criminal defendants in the Superior Court,3 
the duty of the new committee extends to all noncapital felony cases.4 
The magnitude of this duty may be estimated by noting that from 1956 
to 1958, inclusive, there was an annual average of more than nine thou-
sand criminal prosecutions in the Superior Courts of the Common-
wealth, some five thousand of which were guilty pleas, leaving an an-
nual trial case load of approximately four thousand.5 The committee 
will require, and deserves, the wholehearted cooperation of the bar to 
accomplish its important and difficult task_ 
13 Wax v. McGrath, 255 Mass. 340,151 N.E. 317 (1926). 
§11.7. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 565. 
2 The initial appointments are for varying terms of less than four years so as to 
have vacancies occur annually rather than all at once. 
3 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 10. 
4 See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
5 Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Corrections for 1956 (p. 56), 1957 
(p. 54) and 1958 (p. 54) (Pub. Doc. No. 1I5). 
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